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Abstract
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been undergoing fast development for providing broader signal coverage
and more extensive surveillance capabilities in military and civilian applications. Due to the broadcast nature of
the wireless signal and the openness of the space, UAV eavesdroppers (UEDs) pose a potential threat to ground
communications. In this paper, we consider the communications of a legitimate ground link in the presence of friendly
jamming and UEDs within a finite area of space. The spatial distribution of the UEDs obeying a uniform binomial
point process (BPP) is used to characterize the randomness of the UEDs. The ground link is assumed to experience
log-distance path loss and Rayleigh fading, while free space path loss with/without the averaged excess path loss
due to the environment is used for the air-to-ground/air-to-air links. A piecewise function is proposed to approximate
the line-of-sight (LoS) probability for the air-to-ground links, which provides a better approximation than using the
existing sigmoid-based fitting. The analytical expression for the secure connection probability (SCP) of the legitimate
ground link in the presence of non-colluding UEDs is derived. The analysis reveals some useful trends in the SCP as
a function of the transmit signal to jamming power ratio, the location of the UAV jammer, and the height of UAVs.
Index Terms
Unmanned aerial vehicles, physical layer security, secure connection probability, binomial point process, jamming,
non-colluding eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
UNMANNED aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, are a promising technology that offersreliable and cost-effective wireless communication solutions in a wide range of real-world scenarios
[1]. Recently, the low-altitude UAVs with elevated height from hundreds of meters to several kilometers
have drawn much research attention in surveillance, public safety and secure communications [2]–[4].
Compared to the existing terrestrial communication systems, UAV aided wireless networks have the potential
to overcome the propagation constraints due to terrain characteristics, enhance the signal coverage and reduce
operating cost [4]. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless signal and the openness of the space, ground
communications are susceptible to eavesdropping. UAV eavesdroppers (UEDs) could pose a greater threat
to the security of ground communications than ground eavesdroppers, since UEDs are less constrained by
terrain characteristics and a higher chance of line-of-sight (LoS) link with stronger signal strength can be
formed from the ground transmitter to the UEDs rather than to ground eavesdroppers. Furthermore, many
aspects of UAVs such as low production cost, high mobility, and ease of operation could incentivize the
attackers to use UAVs as the major eavesdropping tools. Consequently, it has become increasingly urgent
and necessary to study the security of ground-based wireless communication in the presence of UEDs.
A. Motivation and related work
Among the many methods for securing wireless communication, physical layer security (PLS) has emerged
as a promising technique for achieving a secure transmission by exploiting the channel characteristics through
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2signal processing techniques and channel coding without the need of a shared secret key [5], [6]. By using an
information theoretic formalism, PLS has been shown to support perfect secrecy under realistic condition [7].
Due to the fading effects of wireless channels and the unpredictable locations of eavesdroppers, probabilistic
approaches have been used to characterize the likelihood of a link achieving a secrecy rate, namely, secure
connection probability (SCP) [8]. Stochastic geometry has been exploited for the analysis of eavesdropping
wireless networks by endowing the locations of the eavesdroppers with a probability distribution, such as
the Poisson point process (PPP) or the binomial point process (BPP) [9]–[11]. For example, the spectrum
sharing of super dense drone small cell networks modeled by a 3D PPP is studied in [12]. The authors of
[13] consider the case that the number of UAVs is small and deployed to cover a given finite region with
a more suitable homogeneous BPP for UAV networks under Nakagami-m fading. Since it is common in
deployment scenarios (especially in suburban and rural areas) to have a significantly stronger LoS component
rather than reflected multipath components, the coverage probability in the absence of fading has been derived
in [13]. Furthermore, to capture the performance of an air-to-ground (ATG) link between a ground device
and a UAV, the channel propagation model incorporating blockages from buildings is required. Based on
the statistical model for building blockages [14], the LoS probability in the product of a sequence of terms
and its approximation via sigmoid function is formulated, and the optimal altitude for deploying the UAV
with maximum coverage is studied in [15].
There have been a lot of studies on either optimizing network resources or developing techniques for
realistic system-level analysis of UAV networks on coverage, but it has been pointed out by [4] that very few
studies have investigated the secrecy performance of UAV networks, and only ground-based eavesdroppers
were considered in those scenarios. In [16], the optimization of the secrecy rate of a UAV-enabled mobile
relay system was formulated, and a performance gain over static relaying was achieved. By jointly designing
the trajectory and transmit power of the UAV, an optimization algorithm designed to achieve the average
worst-case secrecy rate improvement in UAV-to-ground communications is proposed in [17]. Additionally,
[4] investigated the secrecy performance of UAV networks working in the millimeter wave band, where the
UAVs can be used either for information transmission or jamming, and it was revealed that the average
achievable secrecy rate does not change monotonically with an increasing proportion of UAV jammers.
Although it is known that increasing the jamming power will pose a stronger interference to both the UEDs
and the legitimate ground receiver, how the secrecy performance behaves with respect to this increase is still
unknown. Furthermore, the coverage and secrecy analysis in the previous literature has suffered from the
tractability problem when the LoS probability is considered, since the analysis always results in multi-integral
expressions.
B. Contributions
This paper focuses on the secrecy performance of ground-based communications in the presence of a
UAV jammer and UEDs. The main contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:
1) LoS model: This is the first work to propose an approximation to simplify the modeling of the
probability of LoS channels, which allows us to get tractable formulations in the analysis of wireless
networks concerning ATG channels. The trend of the LoS probability with respect to the height of
UAVs has been captured in a simplistic manner.
2) UAV jammer: We introduce a UAV jammer for improving the security of the ground communication,
and we give the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SIR) from a ground transmitter to a UED subject to interference by the UAV jammer.
3) SCP: We formulate the SCP of the ground link in the presence of randomly deployed UEDs for the
non-colluding scenario. The trends of the SCP in some environments with respect to different transmit
signal to jamming power ratios, and the locations of the UAV jammer have been analysed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II begins with a description of the system model
then addresses the LoS probability and its approximations. Section III focuses on the derivation of the SCP.
Section IV focuses on the behaviour of the SCP for different parameters. Section V gives the simulation
results and discussion, and Section VI concludes the paper.
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Fig. 1. The system model for communication in the presence of UEDs. The bold solid arrow denotes the legitimate link. For UED e1, the
dashed arrow denotes the wire-tap link, and the dotted arrows denote the jamming links.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Network layout
As shown in Fig. 1, transmitter s at (0, 0, 0) ∈ R3 connects to receiver d at (xd, yd, 0) via the legitimate
link, where xd and yd denotes the locations of d on the x-axis and y-axis, respectively. There are n UEDs
uniformly distributed in a disk, forming a uniform binomial point process (BPP) [13]. The disk is denoted as
O(t, R1), where O denotes the two-dimensional disk of radius R1 centred at t. The coordinates of the origin
of the disk are (0, 0, H) so that the center of the circular plane t is H meters right above the transmitter s
on the ground, and the disk is also parallel to the ground 1. The UEDs work independently to decode the
received signal on their links. Meanwhile, a UAV jammer j is also located within the disk O(t, R1) and
continually sends a jamming signal. The ground channel is assumed to experience Rayleigh fading and path
loss, while the channel model for the ATG communications is based on the probabilistic LoS and non-line-
of-sight (NLoS) links given by [15], [18]. The air-to-air communication channel is assumed to follow Friis
free space transmission. The transmit powers of s and j are given by Ps and Pj , respectively.
B. Channel model
1) Air-to-air channel model: Since no major obstacles are obstructing the communications in the sky,
the air-to-air channel follows Friis free space transmission. And the received jamming power from j to e is
given by
Pj,e = Pj(λ/4pi)
αl−2j,e , (1)
where α = 2 is the free space path loss (FSPL) exponent, and lx,y is the distance between nodes x and y.
2) ATG channel models: The potential existence of buildings and other obstructions lying in the propa-
gation path results in the presence of mixed LoS/NLoS channel conditions between an air terminal and a
ground terminal. According to [18], the ATG channel model will be mainly based on probabilistic LoS and
NLoS links instead of following a classical fading channel. Therefore, the corresponding received signal
powers at e from transmitter s for LoS and NLoS links are written as
Ps,e =
{
ηLPs(λ/4pi)
2l−αs,e , LoS link
ηNPs(λ/4pi)
2l−αs,e , NLoS link,
(2)
and ηL and ηN refer to the mean values of excess path loss added to the FSPL, where (ηL, ηN) can be
measured at fc = 2 GHz in dB to be (−0.1,−21), (−1.0,−20), (−1.6,−23), and (−2.3,−34) for suburban,
urban, dense urban, and highrise urban areas, respectively [15].
1We assume that the ground between s and d is flat, and the effect due to the spherical surface of the earth is negligible.
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Fig. 2. Plots of the LoS probabilities for different urban environments based on the exact product, the sigmoid fitting and the proposed piecewise
fitting. The goodness of fit measure by root-mean-square error is given inside the brackets.
a) LoS probability and sigmoid fitting: The probabilities for a link (s, e) to be either LoS or NLoS
can be denoted as Ps,eL and P
s,e
N = 1− Ps,eL , respectively. According to [14], [15],
Ps,eL =
f(r)∏
l=0
[
1− exp
(
−(H − (l + 1/2)H/(f(r) + 1))
2
2σ2
)]
≈ 1
1 + C exp (−B (θs,e − C))
(3)
where f(r) = br√ρ1ρ2− 1c, r = lt,e is the ground distance between s and e, ρ1 is the ratio of built-up land
area to the total land area, ρ2 is the mean number of buildings per unit area (buildings/km2), and σ is the scale
parameter of the Rayleigh probability density function (PDF), which gives the height distribution of buildings
in meters. The environment parameters (ρ1, ρ2, σ) for typical environments are suburban (0.1, 750, 8), urban
(0.3, 500, 15), dense urban (0.5, 300, 20), and highrise urban (0.5, 300, 50), respectively. Note that increasing
H will increase the smoothness of the plot of the product, and Ps,eL can be considered as a continuous
function of elevation angle and the environment parameters for a large H [15]. The approximation to
the LoS probability of an ATG link is given by a sigmoid function, where C and B are constant values
depending on the aforementioned environment and θs,e is the elevation angle in radians, which is given by
θs,e = tan
−1
(
H
ls,e
)
. The ATG channel model also applies to the received jamming power Pj,d with LoS and
NLoS probability given by Pj,dL and P
j,d
N .
b) Proposed piecewise fitting: Although the sigmoid fitting provides a reasonably good approximation
to the actual LoS probability, it provides a non-linear relationship to ls,e and has been shown to only give
analytical forms which are non-trivial to evaluate. Based on the value of the elevation angle, each curve
of the LoS probability can be divided into three approximated regions: LoS region for the link in a pure
LoS state with high elevation angle, NLoS region for the the link in a pure NLoS state with low elevation
angle, and a transitional region where the link is in mixed LoS/NLoS states. The transitional region can be
further divided into two regions based on the slope of the curve as the elevation angle increases. As a result,
we propose a piecewise fitting model in (4), which not only gives a meaningful relationship between the
LoS probability and ls,e but also provides a tractable way to calculate the SCP as we will show later. The
5Algorithm 1: Finding parameters c1, c2, c3 and c4 for link (s, e) given environment parameters (ρ1, ρ2, σ).
Given: Environment parameters (ρ1, ρ2, σ), thresholds: cl = 0.005, cm = 0.5, and cu = 0.995.
1 Generate 104 evenly spaced samples from [0, pi/2], and obtain the corresponding samples of LoS
probabilities with (3).
2 Create a new dataset Dt1 from the samples of LoS probabilities whose values are bigger than cl and
smaller than cm.
3 Find the coefficients c1 and c2 of the model function c1 tan(θs,e) + c2 by fitting the function to Dt1
with the trust region reflective least squares algorithm.
4 Let c1 tan(θs,e) + c2 = 0, the maximum elevation angle for having only the NLoS link is tan−1
(
− c2
c1
)
.
5 Create a new dataset Dt2 from the samples of LoS probabilities whose values are bigger than cm and
smaller than cu.
6 Find the coefficients c3 and c4 of the model function c3 cot(θs,e) + c4 by fitting the function to Dt2
with the trust region reflective least squares algorithm.
7 Let c3 cot(θs,e) + c4 = 1, the minimum elevation angle for having only the LoS link is tan−1
(
c3
1−c4
)
.
8 The elevation angle at the inflection point, where the LoS probability changes from being
c1 tan(θs,e) + c2 to c3 cot(θs,e) + c4 is tan−1
(
c4−c2−
√
(c4−c2)2+4c1c3
2c1
)
, is obtained by solving
c1 tan(θs,e) + c2 = c3 cot(θs,e) + c4, and then selecting the root which provides a better fit to the
samples of LoS probabilities.
TABLE I
THE PARAMETERS FOR (4) AND (5).
Suburban Urban Dense urban Highrise urban
c1 4.215 1.581 1.201 0.4717
c2 -0.2007 -0.1991 -0.2051 -0.1972
c3 -0.1341 -0.3618 -0.4864 -1.223
c4 1.331 1.341 1.346 1.351
piecewise approximation is given by
Ps,eL =

1, if θs,e > tan−1 H`1
c3 cot(θs,e) + c4, if tan−1 H`2 < θs,e ≤ tan−1 H`1
0, if θs,e ≤ tan−1 H`3
c1 tan(θs,e) + c2, otherwise
(4)
where `1 = H 1−c4c3 , `2 =
2Hc1
c4−c2−
√
(c4−c2)2+4c1c3
, `3 = −H c1c2 , c1, c2, c3 and c4 are given in Table I and obtained
by Algorithm 1, and the corresponding results for different typical environments are plotted in Fig. 2.
Since tan(θs,e) = Hlt,e , (4) can be further written as
Ps,eL =

1, if lt,e < `1
c3lt,e/H + c4, if `1 ≤ lt,e < `2
c1H/lt,e + c2, if `2 ≤ lt,e < `3
0, otherwise.
(5)
In this figure, the proposed piecewise fitting outperforms the sigmoid fitting in the goodness of fit measured
by root-mean-square error. The former is at least four times better than the latter in the suburban environment
and nine times better in the highrise urban environment. The transition region is further approximated by
a linear function of the variable lt,e and another linear function of the reciprocal of lt,e. In the transition
region, Ps,eL increases as lt,e decreases.
63) Ground-to-ground channel model: For ground communications, the log-distance path loss model is
used to characterize the legitimate link from s to d. The received power at d from s is written as
Ps,d = Ps(λ/4pi)
2l−βs,d |hs,d|2 (6)
where λ is the carrier wavelength, |hs,d|2 is the channel gain associated with the Rayleigh fading, and β is
the path loss exponent for ground communications.
III. DERIVATION OF THE SCP
A. Secrecy capacity
Let Φ = {1, 2, ..., n} denote the collection of n UEDs. The secrecy capacity of a link is the difference
between the capacity of the main link and the capacity achieved via a collection of wire-tap links. The
general form is given as [19]
Cs =
log2
 1 + Ps,dPj,d+N0
1 + maxe∈Φ
(
Ps,e
Pj,e+Ne
)
+
≥
[
log2
(
Γ1
maxe∈Φ Γ2
)]+ (7)
where N0 is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power at the ground receiver d, Ne is the AWGN
power at a UED, [x]+ denotes max(0, x) and the approximation holds over interference-limited channels
[20]. ’≥’ holds if the receivers on the UEDs have the low-noise figure by using the thermoelectric cooling
and new materials [21]–[23]. Γ1 = 1 +
Ps,d
Pj,d+N0
represents one plus the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(1 + SINR) from s to d, and Γ2 = 1 +
Ps,e
Pj,e
represents 1 + SIR from s to e, where the interference is due to
UAV jammer j.
B. SCP formulation
The SCP is defined as
pc = P(Cs > Rt) ≥ P
(
Γ1
maxe∈Φ Γ2
> 2Rt
)
(8)
where Rt ≥ 0 is the target secrecy rate. Besides, pc = P(Cs > Rt) ≈ P
(
Γ1
maxe∈Φ Γ2
> 2Rt
)
, when both d
and UEDs are working in an interference-limited environment as the result of a large jamming signal. To
evaluate the above inequality, we require the following calculations.
Since Γ1 is a random variable related to |h|2, the CDF of Γ1 can be written as
F Γ1(γ1) = P
(
1 +
Ps,d
Pj,d +N0
< γ1
)
=P
( |h|2
Λ(ηL)
< γ1 − 1
)
Pj,dL + P
( |h|2
Λ(ηN)
< γ1 − 1
)
Pj,dN
=1− exp ((1− γ1)Λ(ηL))Pj,dL − exp ((1− γ1)Λ(ηN))Pj,dN
(9)
where Λ(η) =
lβs,d
Ps
(
ηl−αj,d Pj +N0
)
, l2j,d = l
2
t,j + l
2
s,d− 2lt,jls,d cos (ϕj′ − ϕd) +H2, j′ denotes the projection of
j on the xy-plane. ϕj′ and ϕd denote the angles of ls,j′ and ls,d measured counterclockwise from the x-axis.
Thus, the corresponding PDF is given by fΓ1(γ1) =
d
d γ1
FΓ1(γ1) such that
fΓ1(γ1) =Λ(ηL) exp ((1− γ1)Λ(ηL))Pj,dL + Λ(ηN) exp ((1− γ1)Λ(ηN))Pj,dN . (10)
7Let e′ denote the projection of the node e on the xy-plane, and φ = ϕj′ − ϕe′ . Γ2 is a random variable
related to the position of one UED e, which is uniformly distributed on the disk O(t, R1). Thus, the CDF
of Γ2 is given by
FΓ2(γ2) = Ee [F1(γ2, lt,e, φ)]
=
1
piR21
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R1
0
F1(γ2, lt,e, φ)lt,e dlt,edφ
(11)
where
F1(γ2, lt,e, φ) = g(γ2, ηL, lt,e, φ)Ps,eL + g(γ2, ηN, lt,e, φ)P
s,e
N (12)
and g(γ, η, `, φ) = 1
(
1 + (H
2+`2)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+`2−2lt,j` cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
≤ γ
)
.
C. Calculation of the SCP
When Ps,eL is given by (3), it is hard to find a closed-form expression for (11). To make progress, we use
(4) instead, which can yield a closed-form expression for (11) with any given R1 and H . With the help of
(4), we can divide the LoS probability into multiple regions, and calculate their contributions to FΓ2(γ2)
independently. This decomposition technique to obtain (11) seems to be tedious, but necessary, because it
leads to a tractable solution. Throughout the following discussion, we refer to a number of propositions,
which will be presented in Section III-D.
For R1 < `1, where l1 is considered in (5), the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is always in
a pure LoS state since lt,e ≤ R1. Following Proposition 1, we have
FΓ2(γ2) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R1
0
g(γ2, ηL, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ = FΓ3(γ2, ηL, R1). (13)
For `1 ≤ R1 < `2, the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in a pure LoS state if lt,e < `1, and
the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in the mixed LoS/NLoS states with Ps,eL = c3lt,e/H + c4
if `1 ≤ lt,e ≤ R1. Following Propositions 1 and 3, we have
FΓ2(γ2) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ `1
0
g(γ2, ηL, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ +
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R1
`1
F1(γ2, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ
= FΓ3(γ2, ηL, `1) + FΓ5(γ2, ηL, ηN, R1)− FΓ5(γ2, ηL, ηN, `1).
(14)
For `2 ≤ R1 < `3, the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in a pure LoS state if lt,e < `1, the
ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in the mixed LoS/NLoS states with Ps,eL = c3lt,e/H + c4 if
`1 ≤ lt,e < `2, and the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in the mixed LoS/NLoS states with
Ps,eL = c1H/lt,e + c2 if `2 ≤ lt,e ≤ R1. Following Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we have
F Γ2(γ2) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ `1
0
g(γ2, ηL, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ +
∫ 2pi
0
∫ R1
`1
F1(γ2, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ
=FΓ3(γ2, ηL, `1) + FΓ5(γ2, ηL, ηN, `2)− FΓ5(γ2, ηL, ηN, `1) + FΓ4(γ2, ηL, ηN, R1)− FΓ4(γ2, ηL, ηN, `2).
(15)
For R1 ≥ `3, the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in a pure LoS state if lt,e < `1, the
ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in the mixed LoS/NLoS states with Ps,eL = c3lt,e/H + c4
if `1 ≤ lt,e < `2, the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in the mixed LoS/NLoS states with
Ps,eL = c1H/lt,e + c2 if `2 ≤ lt,e < `3, and the ATG link between transmitter s and UED e is in a pure NLoS
state if `3 ≤ lt,e ≤ R1. Following Propositions 1, 2 and 3, we have
FΓ2(γ2) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ `1
0
g(γ2, ηL, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ +
∫ 2pi
0
∫ `3
`1
F1(γ2, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ+∫ 2pi
0
∫ R1
`3
g(γ2, ηN, lt,e, φ)
lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ
=FΓ3(γ2, ηL, `1) + FΓ5(γ2, ηL, ηN, `2)− FΓ5(γ2, ηL, ηN, `1)+
FΓ4(γ2, ηL, ηN, `3)− FΓ4(γ2, ηL, ηN, `2) + FΓ3(γ2, ηN, R1)− FΓ3(γ2, ηN, `3).
(16)
8TABLE II
TABLE OF CONDITIONS.
Case index Condition
1 A < 0, B ≤ 0, r2A < B, −r2A−B
2r
≤ lt,j , lt,j 6=
√
BA
2 A < 0, B ≤ 0, r2A = B, −r2A−B
2r
≤ lt,j , lt,j 6=
√
BA
3 A < 0, B ≤ 0, r2A < B,√BA < lt,j < −r2A−B2r
4 A < 0, B ≤ 0, r2A > B, −r2A−B
2r
≤ lt,j
5 Other cases under A < 0, B ≤ 0
6 A > 0, B ≥ 0, r2A > B, r2A+B
2r
≤ lt,j , lt,j 6=
√
BA
7 A > 0, B ≥ 0, r2A = B, r2A+B
2r
≤ lt,j , lt,j 6=
√
BA
8 A > 0, B ≥ 0, r2A > B,√BA < lt,j < r2A+B2r
9 A > 0, B ≥ 0, r2A < B, r2A+B
2r
≤ lt,j
10 A < 0, B > 0, lt,j ≥ |r
2A+B|
2r
11 A < 0, B > 0,−r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
12 Other cases under A < 0, B > 0
13 A > 0, B < 0,−r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
14 A > 0, B < 0, lt,j ≥ |r
2A+B|
2r
15 A > 0, B < 0,−r2A < B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
16 A = 0,
l2t,j−H2
2r
≤ lt,j , lt,j > H
17 A = 0,
H2−l2t,j
2r
≤ lt,j , lt,j < H
18 A = 0, lt,j = H
19 A = 0, lt,j <
H2−l2t,j
2r
As a result of the above decomposition, pc is lower bounded by
P
(
Γ1
maxe∈Φ Γ2
> 2Rt
)
=
∫ ∞
1
FΓ2
( γ1
2Rt
)n
fΓ1(γ1) dγ1. (17)
D. Propositions
All three propositions given below rely on Lemma 1, which is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Let r ≤ R1, assuming that the link (s, e) is always in the same channel state (i.e, pure LoS
or pure NLoS) with gain η, the CDF of Γ2 conditioning on that e is only active for lt,e ≤ r is given by
FΓ3(y, η, r) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ r
0
g(γ2, η, lt,e, φ)lt,e
piR21
dlt,edφ =
S1(y, η, r)
piR21/2
(18)
where
S1(y, η, r) =

D1 +D2 − 12D3, cases 1, 9, 10
D2 +D4, cases 2, 7
1
2
pir2 −D3, cases 3, 11
D1 +D2 +
1
2
D3, cases 4, 6, 14
1
2
pir2, cases 5, 12, 13, 19
D3, cases 8, 15
D5, cases 16, 17, 18
0, otherwise
(19)
and all the cases with index numbers are given in Table II, D1 =
AB−l2t,j
2A2
cot−1
(
a1−2B√
4l2t,jr
2−a12
)
, A = 1 −(
(y − 1) Pj
ηPs
) 2
α
, B = l2t,j−(1−A)H2, a1 = Ar2 +B, D2 = pir
2
4
− A
4A2
√
4l2t,jr
2 − a12− a1A−l
2
t,j
2A2
csc−1
(
2lt,jr
a1
)
,
D3 =
l2t,j−AB
2A2
pi, D4 =
(a1−2B)
√
4j2r2−a12
4A2r2
, D5 = 12r
2 sec−1
(
2lt,jr
a1
)
− (l
2
t,j−H2)
√
4l2t,jr
2−(H2−l2t,j)
2
8l2t,j
.
9Proof:
1
piR21
∫ 2pi
0
∫ r
0
g(y, ηL, lt,e, φ)lt,e dlt,edφ
=
1
piR21
∫
oφ(η)
∫
olt,e (η)
lt,e dlt,edφ
=
r2
R21
− 1
piR21
∫
o′φ(η)
∫
o′lt,e (η)
lt,e dlt,edφ
(20)
where oφ(η) and olt,e(η) are the domains so that 1 +
(H2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
≤ y, while o′φ(η) and o′lt,e(η)
are the domains so that 1 + (H
2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
> y. Given Lemma 1, (18) is achieved. Thus, we
conclude the proof.
Proposition 2. Let r ≤ R1, assuming that the mixed LoS/NLoS states exist for link (s, e), and the (quasi-)
LoS probability is Ps,eL = c1H/lt,e + c2, the CDF of Γ2 conditioning on the UED e being active within the
disk O(t, r) is given by
FΓ4(y, ηL, ηN, r) =
2
piR21
(
c2S1(y, ηL, r) + c1HS2(y, ηL, r) + (1− c2)S1(y, ηN, r)− c1HS2(y, ηN, r)
)
(21)
S2(y, η, r) =

G1 −G2 +G3 −G4, cases 1, 2
pir +G1 − 2G2, cases 3
G3 +G4 −G2, cases 4, 14
pir, cases 5, 12, 13, 19
G3 +G4 −G5, cases 6, 7
−G5, case 8
G3 −G4, cases 9, 10
pir −G2, case 11
−G2, case 15
G6, cases 16, 17
1
2
pir, case 18
0, otherwise
(22)
and all the cases with index are given in Table II, G0 =
2
√
−AB+l2t,j
−A , G1 = G0E
(
sec−1
(
−lt,j√
BA
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
,
G2 = G0E
(
l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
, G3 =
√
4l2t,jr
2−a12−2Ar2 sec−1
(
2lt,jr
a1
)
−2Ar , G4 = G0E
(
sec−1
(
2lt,jr
a1
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
/2, G5 =
G0E
(
sec−1
(
lt,j√
BA
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
, G6 = r cos
−1
(
l2t,j−H2
2lt,jr
)
− l2t,j−H2
2lt,j
ln
√
4l2t,jr
2−(H2−l2t,j)
2
+2lt,jr
|l2t,j−H2| , E(·) and E(· | ·)
denote complete and incomplete elliptic integral of the 2nd kind [24].
Proof:∫ 2pi
0
∫ r
0
(g(y, ηL, lt,e, φ)Ps,eL + g(y, ηN, lt,e, φ)P
s,e
N )lt,e dlt,edφ
=
∫
oφ(ηL)
∫
olt,e (ηL)
(c1H + c2lt,e) dlt,edφ+
∫
oφ(ηN)
∫
olt,e (ηN)
(−c1H + (1− c2)lt,e) dlt,edφ
=c1H
∫
oφ(ηL)
∫
olt,e (ηL)
dlt,edφ+ 2c2S1(y, ηL, r)− c1H
∫
oφ(ηN)
∫
olt,e (ηN)
dlt,edφ+ 2(1− c2)S1(y, ηN, r)
(23)
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where
∫
oφ(η)
∫
olt,e (η)
dlt,edφ = 2pir −
∫
o′φ(η)
∫
o′lt,e (η)
dlt,edφ. Given the domains in Lemma 1 and dividing
(23) by piR21, (21) is achieved. Thus, we conclude the proof.
Proposition 3. Let r ≤ R1, assuming that the mixed LoS/NLoS states exist for link (s, e), and the (quasi-)
LoS probability is Ps,eL = c3lt,e/H + c4, the CDF of Γ2 conditioning on the UED e being active within the
disk O(t, r) is given by
FΓ5(y, ηL, ηN, r) =
2
piR21
(
c4S1(y, ηL, r) +
c3
3H
S3(y, ηL, r) + (1− c4)S1(y, ηN, r)− c3
3H
S3(y, ηN, r)
)
(24)
S3(y, η, r) =

M3 +M4 −M1 −M2, cases 1, 2
pir3 − 2M2 +M3, case 3
M1 −M2 +M4, cases 4, 14
pir3, cases 5, 12, 13, 19
M1 −M3 +M4, cases 6, 7
−M3, case 8
−M1 +M4, cases 9, 10
−M2 + pir3, case 11
−M2, case 15
pir3 −M5 −M6, case 16
M5 +M6, case 17
pir3/2, case 18
0, otherwise
(25)
and all the cases with index are given in Table II, M0 =
√
−AB+l2t,j
−3A3/2 ,
2M1
M0
= 4BAF
(
sec−1
(
lt,jr
a1/2
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
+(
8l2t,j − 7BA
)
E
(
sec−1
(
lt,jr
a1/2
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
, M2 = M04BAK
(
l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
+M0
(
8l2t,j − 7BA
)
E
(
l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
, M3 =
M0
(
8l2t,j − 7BA
)
E
(
sec−1
(
−lt,j√
BA
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
+ M04BAF
(
sec−1
(
−lt,j√
BA
)
| l2t,j
l2t,j−AB
)
, M4 = r
3 cos−1 Ar
2+B
2lt,jr
+
M0
4r
(
A(2a1 − 9B) + 8l2t,j
)√4l2t,jr2−a12
l2t,j−AB
, M5 = r
3 cos−1 |H
2−l2t,j|
−2lt,jr , M6 =
r|H2−l2t,j |
8l2t,j
√
4l2t,jr
2 − (H2 − l2t,j)2 +
|H2−l2t,j |3
16l3t,j
ln
√
4l2t,jr
2−(H2−l2t,j)
2
+2lt,jr
|H2−l2t,j| , K(·) and F(· | ·) denote complete and incomplete elliptic integral of the
1st kind [24].
Proof:∫ 2pi
0
∫ r
0
(g(y, ηL, lt,e, φ)Ps,eL + g(y, ηN, lt,e, φ)P
s,e
N )lt,e dlt,edφ
=
∫
oφ(ηL)
∫
olt,e (ηL)
(
c3lt,e
2/H + c4lt,e
)
dlt,edφ+
∫
oφ(ηN)
∫
olt,e (ηN)
(−c3lt,e2/H + (1− c4)lt,e) dlt,edφ
=
c3
H
∫
oφ(ηL)
∫
olt,e (ηL)
l2t,e dlt,edφ+ 2c4S1(y, ηL, r)−
c3
H
∫
oφ(ηN)
∫
olt,e (ηN)
l2t,e dlt,edφ+ 2(1− c4)S1(y, ηN, r)
(26)
where
∫
oφ(η)
∫
olt,e (η)
l2t,edlt,edφ+
∫
o′φ(η)
∫
o′lt,e (η)
l2t,edlt,edφ =
2
3
pir3. Given Lemma 1 and dividing (26) by piR21,
(24) is achieved. Thus, we conclude the proof.
11
0 2 4 6 8 10
x
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
y
d1= 1.2, d2= 0.5
d1= 0.2, d2= 0.4
Fig. 3. The plot of hyperbola (27). The solid lines are the hyperbolas in the first quadrant and the dashed lines are horizontal asymptotes.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SCP
A. Trend of the SCP with respect to Ps
Pj
This subsection investigates the trend of the SCP with respect to transmitting-to-jamming power ratio
Ps
Pj
for d and UEDs working in an interference-limited regime. Let variable x = Ps
Pj
, and random variables
d1 =
l−βs,d |hs,d|2
l−αj,d ηj,d
, d2 = maxe∈Φ
(
l−αs,e ηs,e
l−αj,e
)
, we have
y =
1 +
Ps,d
Pj,d
1 + maxe∈Φ
(
Ps,e
Pj,e
) = 1 + d1x
1 + d2x
(27)
for x ≥ 0. As shown in Fig. 3, y is a hyperbola for d1, d2 > 0. Its horizontal asymptote is y = d1/d2.
A special point that the curve passes through the x-axis is (−1/d1, 0), and the vertical asymptote of the
hyperbola is given by x = −1/d2. Clearly, when x = 0, y = 1 and the achievable secrecy rate is zero.
For d1 > d2, the hyperbola y is monotonically increasing in x, and if d1 < d2, y is monotonically
decreasing on x. Note that (8) defines the statistical comparison between (27) and 2Rt where Rt ≥ 0.
For d1 < d2, y is always less than one. Hence, it is smaller than 2Rt . Therefore, when d1 < d2, neither
increasing nor decreasing Ps/Pj will affect the results of the comparison between (27) and 2Rt . Consequently,
the monotonicity of (8) is solely decided by d1 > d2. As a result, the SCP is monotonically increasing as
Ps/Pj increases.
Meanwhile, whenRt = 0, neither increasing nor decreasing Ps/Pj will affect the results of the comparison
between (8) and 2Rt because (27) is always larger than one for d1 > d2, while (27) is always smaller than
one for d1 < d2. To conclude, the analysis above shows that for a given Ps, the less Pj the better the SCP in
the interference-limited environment. As we will see in the following section, deploying the UAV jammer
to a carefully chosen position would benefit the communication networks than the case without the UAV
jammer.
B. Trend of the SCP with respect to jammer’s position
This subsection investigates the trend of the SCP with respect to jammer’s position when all ATG links are
in a pure LoS state and H2 >> (R1 + ls,d)2. An important aspect of UAV networks is the high likelihood of
having significantly stronger LoS components than the reflected multipath components in some deployment
scenarios (especially in suburban and rural morphologies) [13]. Hence, it is very important to study the
performance of the SCP for the ATG links in a pure LoS state. According to (5), for ATG links in a pure
LoS state, as H increases, they will remain in a pure LoS state.
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Given l2j,d = l
2
t,j + l
2
s,d − 2lt,jls,d cos (ϕj′ − ϕd) + H2 and l2s,e = H2 + l2t,e, when H2 >> (R1 + ls,d)2 and
R1 ≥ lt,j , we have lj,d ≈ ls,e ≈ H , and
1 +
Ps,d
Pj,d+N0
1 + maxe∈Φ
(
Ps,e
Pj,e+Ne
) ≈ 1 + Psl
−β
s,d |hs,d|2
PjH−αηL+N0
1 + PsηL
Hα
maxe∈Φ
(
1
Pj l
−α
j,e +Ne
) . (28)
According to (28), the performance of the SCP is related to maxe∈Φ lj,e. For a UED e uniformly distributed
within a disk, the PDF of le,j conditoning on lt,j is proportional to the circular arc of the circle O(j, lj,e) that
is enclosed by the disk O(t, R1) [25]. Assuming that for a given lt,j , the domain of lj,e with non-zero density
is [0, Z1], where Z1 > 0. Then, as lt,j increases by δ > 0 and j still stays within the circle O(t, R1). The
new non-zero domain of lj,e is [0, Z1 + δ], and the density of lj,e is decreasing in lt,j for any lj,e ∈ [0, Z1].
Thus, the mean of lj,e increases as lt,j increases. As a result, when the number of the UEDs is one, placing
UAV jammer j to t (i.e., lt,j = 0) will provide the optimum SCP for H2 >> (R1 + ls,d)2.
Meanwhile, for multiple UEDs, we have the following discussion. Let n i.i.d. random variables X1, ..., Xn
denote the distances from n UEDs to j, the CDF of Y = max(X1, ..., Xn) conditioning on lt,j is given by
P (Y ≤ y | lt,j) i.i.d= P (X1 ≤ y | lt,j)n (29)
and the corresponding PDF is written as
fY (y | lt,j) = n(P (X1 ≤ y | lt,j))n−1fX1(y | lt,j) (30)
where fX1(y | lt,j) is the conditional PDF of X1. For an infinitesimal ∆δ, when the upper bound of the
domain of lt,j with non-zero density increases from Z1 to Z1 + ∆δ by moving j away from t, we have
fY (Z1 + ∆δ | lt,j + ∆δ) = nfX1(Z1 + ∆δ | lt,j + ∆δ) > 0 (31)
since P (X1 ≤ Z1 + ∆δ | lt,j + ∆δ) = 1. Meanwhile, as a result of the previous discussion for one UED,
we have both fX1(y | lt,j) ≥ fX1(y | lt,j + ∆δ) and P (X1 ≤ y | lt,j) ≥ P (X1 ≤ y | lt,j + ∆δ) for y ∈ [0, Z1].
According to (30),
fY (y | lt,j + ∆δ) ≤ fY (y | lt,j) (32)
for y ∈ [0, Z1]. As a result of (31) and (32), the mean of maxe∈Φ lj,e increases as lt,j increases. Thus, placing
UAV jammer j at t will obtain the optimum SCP for H2 >> (R1 + ls,d)2.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
To validate the derivation and the analysis of the SCP with respect to different variables, simulations based
on LTE parameters were developed. The parameters used in the simulation are given in Table III unless
otherwise specified. The receiver d and UEDs are assumed to have the same noise power. The simulation
results are obtained by averaging over 1× 105 independent Monte Carlo trials.
Fig. 4 shows the performance of the SCP in the simulation for UEDs at different heights. The numerical
results in this section are obtained by evaluating (17) for the same parameters as the simulations. One can
easily see that the numerical results act as the lower bound to the simulation results of the SCP when Pj is
small. The simulation curves match well with the numerical results as Pj reaches the interference-limited
regime. In this regime, the performance of the SCP is decreasing as Pj increases. This can be easily explained
by the discussion on Ps/Pj in (27). Meanwhile, the same figure also shows that introducing a UAV jammer
to the ground communications could change the performance of the SCP significantly. On the one hand, for
H = 500 m and 1000 m, the SCP increases as Pj increases until around 10−3 W and then starts to decrease
until the SCP reaches zero. Compared to the similar settings without the UAV jammer, introducing a UAV
jammer with proper Pj would allow the ground communications to achieve a higher SCP. For H = 500 m
and 1000 m, the ground communications with a UAV jammer allow the maximum of 20% and 60% increase
in SCP, respectively, over the case without a UAV jammer as given by the dashed lines. On the other hand,
for H = 100 m, the SCP increases as Pj increases. By having a UAV jammer in this height, the SCP of
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TABLE III
SYSTEM PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Environment Suburban
Disk radius R1 500 m
Receiver location d (100, 0, 0)
Coding gain 0 dB
Tx/Rx antenna gain 0 dBi
Receiver noise figure 9 dB
Carrier frequency 2.0 GHz
Spectrum allocation 20 MHz
Duplex mode Half duplex
Thermal noise power density -174 dBm/Hz
Path loss exponent β 3
Transmit power Ps 0.1 W
Target secrecy rate Rt 1 bit/s/Hz
Number of UEDs n 1
10-8 10-6 10-4 10-2 100
Pj
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
SC
P
H=1000(m)
H=1000(m)
H=1000(m)
H=500(m)
H=500(m)
H=500(m)
H=100(m)
H=100(m)
H=100(m)
Fig. 4. SCP vs. ground location of UAV jammer for different Pj in watt as given by the figure legends. For the same color, the solid line
represents the numerical results with the UAV jammer, the markers represent the simulation results with the UAV jammer and the dashed line
represents the simulation results without the UAV jammer. j = (0, 0, 500).
the ground communications will be affected severely. Meanwhile, notice the case without the UAV jammer,
the achieved SCP in dashed lines show that the SCP at H = 100 m is higher than the one at H = 500 m,
while this trend is reversed when comparing H = 500 m to H = 1000 m. It is because increasing H will
cause not only a higher LoS probability from the transmitter to a UED but also a longer receiving distance
(i.e., a higher path loss). In general, the ground communications prefer to have NLoS links towards the
UEDs and have a maximum distance from it, however, these two objectives conflicts with each other. If the
LoS probability from the transmitter to a UED contributes more than the path loss does to the SCP as H
increases, the SCP will decrease. Otherwise, the SCP will increase.
Fig. 5 depicts the simulation results on the SCP when all ATG links are in a pure LoS state. When
H = 2000, the performance of the SCP is optimum when placing the UAV jammer at (0, 0, H). This can
be explained by the discussion on (28). The performance curves from H = 300 to H = 2000 show that,
for the UAV jammer with the same x and y coordinates, the SCP increases as H increases. This can also
be explained by (28), where the right term decreases as H increases for the ATG links in a pure LoS state.
Meanwhile, Fig. 6 gives the cases without the requirement on a pure LoS state for ATG links. In general,
the trend of the SCP with respect to the height of UAVs is hard to capture, because increasing H will not
only cause a higher LoS probability but also decreases the jamming and received signal powers. A higher
LoS probability from s to UED will cause the SCP to drop while a smaller jamming power will cause the
SCP to increase. Meanwhile, the convex surface shows that the jammer should move away from the receiver
d in order to achieve a higher SCP. Furthermore, by observing both Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, the numerical results
of the SCP matching with the simulation results suggest that both receiver d and UEDs are working in the
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Fig. 5. SCP vs. location of UAV jammer, where Pj = 0.01 W. The mesh grids represent simulation results, and the markers represent numerical
results.
Fig. 6. SCP vs. location of UAV jammer, where Pj = 0.01 W. The mesh grids represent simulation results, and the markers represent numerical
results.
interference-limited regime for Pj = 0.01 W. By increasing H from 50 m to 200m, the SCP at the given x
and y coordinates decreases first and then increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the secrecy performance of the ground link in the presence of randomly
deployed non-colluding UEDs. A piecewise fitting model has been proposed to characterize the LoS proba-
bility of an ATG link with higher accuracy than the existing sigmoid fitting. The SCP has been formulated
based on the piecewise fitting model so that the formulation become tractable. The performance of the SCP
with respect to transmitting-to-jamming power ratio, the height of the UAVs and the UAV jammer location
has been investigated. The effective jamming power and location of the UAV jammer have been pointed
out. The model and analysis frameworks presented in this paper will help to facilitate the analysis of the
UAV-aided communications.
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APPENDIX
Lemma 1. For a UED e which is uniformly distributed within the disk O(t, r), denote φ = ϕj′ − ϕe′ and
η as the excess path loss, the domains of φ and lt,e so that 1 +
(H2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
≤ y is denoted
as {oφ(η), olt,e(η)}, while the domains of φ and lt,e so that 1 + (H
2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
> y is denoted as
{o′φ(η), o′lt,e(η)}. Let F1 = cos−1−
√
BA
lt,j
, F2 = cos−1 r2A+B2rlt,j , A = 1−
(
(y − 1) Pj
ηPs
) 2
α
, B = l2t,j − (1−A)H2.
x1 =
lt,j cosφ+
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2−BA
A
, and x2 =
lt,j cosφ−
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2−BA
A
. Based on different A and B, these domains
are given as follows.
For A < 0, B ≤ 0, we have o′lt,e(η) = [x1, x2] and
o′φ(η) =

[F1,F2] , if r2A ≤ B, −r2A−B2r ≤ lt,j
[F1, pi] , if r2A < B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j < −r2A−B2r
{∅}, otherwise;
(33)
or o′lt,e(η) = [x1, r] and
o′φ(η) =

(F2, pi] , if r2A ≤ B, −r2A−B2r ≤ lt,j
[F2, pi] , if r2A > B, −r2A−B2r ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(34)
For A > 0, B ≥ 0, we have olt,e(η) = [x2, x1] and
oφ(η) =

[F2, pi −F1] , if r2A ≥ B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0, pi −F1] , if r2A > B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j < r2A+B2r
{∅}, otherwise;
(35)
or olt,e(η) = [x2, r] and
oφ(η) =

[0,F2] , if r2A ≤ B, r2A+B2r ≤ lt,j
[0,F2) , if r2A > B, r2A+B2r ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(36)
For A < 0, B > 0, we have o′lt,e(η) = [0, r] and
o′φ(η) =

[0, pi], if − r2A < B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
(F2, pi] , if lt,j ≥ |r
2A+B|
2r
{∅}, otherwise;
(37)
or o′lt,e(η) = [0, x2] and
o′φ(η) =

[0, pi], if − r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
[0,F2] , if lt,j ≥ |r
2A+B|
2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(38)
For A > 0, B < 0, we have olt,e(η) = [0, r] and
oφ(η) =

[0, pi], if − r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
[0,F2] , if lt,j ≥ |r2A+B|2r
{∅}, otherwise;
(39)
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or olt,e(η) = [0, x1] and
oφ(η) =

[0, pi], if − r2A < B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
[F2, pi] , if lt,j ≥ |r2A+B|2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(40)
For A = 0, we have olt,e(η) =
[ |l2t,j−H2|
2lt,j
, r
]
and
oφ(η) =

[
0, cos−1
(
l2t,j−H2
2lt,j lt,e
)]
, if |l
2
t,j−H2|
2lt,j
≤ r
{∅}, otherwise;
(41)
or olt,e(η) =
[
0,
−l2t,j+H2
2lt,j
)
and
oφ(η) =
{
[0, pi], if r ≥ −l2t,j+H2
2lt,j
{∅}, otherwise;
(42)
or olt,e(η) = [0, r] and
oφ(η) =
{
[0, pi], if r <
−l2t,j+H2
2lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(43)
Proof: For A 6= 0, the corresponding solutions of lt,e in 1 + (H
2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
= y are denoted
as
x1 =
lt,j cosφ+
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA
A
x2 =
lt,j cosφ−
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA
A
(44)
where x1 ≤ x2 for A < 0, while x2 ≤ x1 for A > 0. For x1 and x2 to exist,
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≥ 0. (45)
As a result, cosφ ≥
√
BA
lt,j
or cosφ ≤ −
√
BA
lt,j
for BA ≥ 0, and (lt,j cosφ)2 ≥ 0 for BA < 0. Since
φ = ϕj′ − ϕe′ and the impact from j to e for φ ∈ [0, pi] is the same as the case for φ ∈ [pi, 2pi]. Thus, we
only consider φ ∈ [0, pi] in the following analysis. The domains of φ in (45) are given by
φ ≤ pi −F1, for lt,j ≥
√
BA,BA ≥ 0, (46)
φ ≥ F1, for lt,j ≥
√
BA,BA ≥ 0, (47)
φ ∈ [0, pi], for BA < 0. (48)
Meanwhile, 1 + (H
2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cosφ)
−α
2 Pj
≤ y gives
Al2t,e − 2lt,j cos(φ)lt,e + l2t,j − (1− A)H2 ≤ 0. (49)
Apparently, when A < 0, lt,e ≥ x2 or lt,e ≤ x1; when A > 0, x2 ≤ lt,e ≤ x1. To simplify analysis, we
investigate x1 ≤ lt,e ≤ x2 for A < 0 and x2 ≤ lt,e ≤ x1 for A > 0. As a result, the former is the case for
A < 0 and
Al2t,e − 2lt,j cos(φ)lt,e + l2t,j − (1− A)H2 ≥ 0. (50)
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For A < 0, B ≤ 0: Assuming that (45) holds, comparing x1 with 0 gives
φ ∈
[pi
2
, pi
]
, for x1 ≥ 0; and φ ∈
[
0,
pi
2
]
, for x1 < 0. (51)
Assuming that (45) holds, comparing x2 with 0 and considering that x1 ≤ x2 for A < 0, we have
φ ∈
[pi
2
, pi
]
, x2 ≥ 0. (52)
Comparing x1 with r, we have
x1 ≤ r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≥ rA− lt,j cosφ. (53)
If
rA− lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, (54)
then
φ ∈
{
[F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ −rA
{∅}, if lt,j < −rA
(55)
where F3 = cos−1 rAlt,j .
Assuming that (45) and (54) hold, solving (53) gives
φ ∈
{
[F2, pi], if lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
{∅}, otherwise. (56)
Combining (55) and (56) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[F3, pi], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ −rA
[F2, pi], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(57)
Combining (57) and (47) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[F3, pi], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ −rA
[F2, pi], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(58)
If rA− lt,j cosφ < 0, then
φ ∈
{
[0, pi], if lt,j < −rA
[0,F3), if lt,j ≥ −rA.
(59)
Combining (59) and (47) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[F1, pi], if r2A < B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j < −rA
[F1,F3), if r2A < B, lt,j ≥ −rA
{∅}, otherwise.
(60)
The unions of (58) and (60) give
φ ∈

[F2, pi], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
[F1, pi], if r2A ≤ B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(61)
Comparing r with x2,
x2 > r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA > −rA+ lt,j cosφ. (62)
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If
− rA+ lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, (63)
then
φ ∈
{
[0, pi], if lt,j < −rA
[0,F3], if lt,j ≥ −rA.
(64)
Assuming that (45) and (63) hold, solving (62) gives
φ ∈
{
(F2, pi], if lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
{∅}, otherwise. (65)
Combining (64) and (65) with intersections yields
φ ∈

(F2, pi], if r2A < B, −r2A−B2r ≤ lt,j < −rA
(F2,F3], if r2A < B, lt,j ≥ −rA
{∅}, otherwise.
(66)
Then, the intersections of (66) and (47) yield (66).
If −rA+ lt,j cosφ < 0, then
φ ∈
{
(F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ −rA
{∅}, otherwise. (67)
Then, combining (67) and (47) with intersections yields
φ ∈

(F3, pi], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ −rA
[F1, pi], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥
√
BA
{∅}, otherwise.
(68)
Therefore, the regions for x2 > r are given by the unions of (66) and (68):
φ ∈

(F2, pi], if r2A ≤ B, −r2A−B2r ≤ lt,j
[F1, pi], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥
√
BA
{∅}, otherwise.
(69)
Meanwhile,
x2 ≤ r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≤ −rA+ lt,j cosφ. (70)
If −rA+ lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, we have (64).
Assuming that (45) and (64) hold, solving (70) gives
φ ∈
{
[0,F2], if lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
[0, pi], if lt,j < −r
2A−B
2r
.
(71)
Combining (64) and (71) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0,F2], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
[0,F3], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ −rA
[0, pi], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
[0, pi], if r2A > B, lt,j < −rA
{∅}, otherwise.
(72)
The intersections of (72) and (47) are given by (33). As a result, when 0 ≤ x1 ≤ r and x2 ≤ r, we have
(33). Meanwhile, when 0 ≤ x1 ≤ r and x2 > r, we have (34).
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For A > 0, B ≥ 0: Assuming that (45) holds, comparing x2 with 0 gives
φ ∈
[pi
2
, pi
]
, for x2 < 0; and φ ∈
[
0,
pi
2
]
, for x2 ≥ 0. (73)
Assuming that (45) holds, comparing x1 with 0 gives
φ ∈
[pi
2
, pi
]
, for x1 < 0; and φ ∈
[
0,
pi
2
]
, for x1 ≥ 0. (74)
Since x1 must be larger than 0 for a valid region to exist, φ ∈
[
0, pi
2
]
and (46) stands.
Comparing x2 with r, we have
x2 ≤ r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≥ lt,j cosφ− rA. (75)
If
lt,j cosφ− rA ≥ 0, (76)
then
φ ∈
{
[0,F3], if lt,j ≥ rA
{∅}, if lt,j < rA.
(77)
Assuming that (45) and (76) hold, solving (75) gives
φ ∈
{
[0,F2], if lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
{∅}, if lt,j < r2A+B2r .
(78)
Then, combining (77), (78) and (46) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0,F3], if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ rA
[0,F2], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(79)
If lt,j cosφ− rA < 0, then
φ ∈
{
[0, pi], if lt,j < rA
(F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ rA.
(80)
Then, combining (80) and (46) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0, pi −F1], if r2A > B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j < rA
(F3, pi −F1], if r2A > B, rA ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(81)
The unions of (79) and (81) yield
φ ∈

[0,F2], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0, pi −F1], if r2A > B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(82)
Comparing r with x1,
x1 ≤ r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≤ rA− lt,j cosφ. (83)
If
rA− lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, (84)
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then
φ ∈
{
[0, pi], if lt,j < rA
[F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ rA.
(85)
Assuming that (45) and (84) hold, solving (83) gives
φ ∈
{
[0, pi], if lt,j < r
2A+B
2r
[F2, pi] , if lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r .
(86)
Combining (86) and (85) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0, pi], if r2A < B, lt,j < rA
[0, pi], if r2A ≥ B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
[F3, pi], if r2A < B, rA ≤ lt,j
[F2, pi], if r2A ≥ B, r2A+B2r ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(87)
Then, combining (87) and (46) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[F2, pi −F1], if r2A ≥ B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0, pi −F1], if r2A ≥ B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j < r2A+B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(88)
x1 > r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA > rA− lt,j cosφ. (89)
If
rA− lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, (90)
we have (85).
Assuming that (45) and (90) hold, solving (89) gives
φ ∈
{
[0,F2), if lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
{∅}, otherwise. (91)
Combining (85) and (91) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[F3,F2), if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ rA
[0,F2), if r2A > B, r2A+B2r ≤ lt,j < rA
{∅}, otherwise.
(92)
If rA− lt,j cosφ < 0, we have
φ ∈
{
[0,F3), if lt,j ≥ rA
{∅}, otherwise. (93)
The unions of (92) and (93) yield
φ ∈

[0,F2), if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0,F3), if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ rA
{∅}, otherwise.
(94)
Then, combining (94) and (46) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0,F2), if r2A > B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0, pi −F1], if r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥
√
BA
{∅}, otherwise.
(95)
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The feasible regions of φ, where x2 ≤ r and x1 ≤ r, are the intersections of (82) and (95). As a result,
φ ∈

[F2, pi −F1], if r2A ≥ B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0, pi −F1], if r2A > B,
√
BA ≤ lt,j < r2A+B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(96)
The feasible regions of φ, where x2 ≤ r and x1 > r, are the intersections of (82) and (88). As a result,
φ ∈

[0,F2], if r2A ≤ B, r2A+B2r ≤ lt,j
[0,F2), if r2A > B, r2A+B2r ≤ lt,j
{∅}, otherwise.
(97)
As a result, when x2 ≤ r and x1 ≤ r, we have (35). Meanwhile, when x2 ≤ r and x1 > r, we have (36).
For A < 0, B > 0: Comparing x1 with 0 gives
φ ∈ [0, pi] , for x1 < 0; and φ = ∅, for x1 ≥ 0. (98)
Comparing x2 with 0 gives
φ = ∅, for x2 < 0; and φ ∈ [0, pi] , for x2 ≥ 0. (99)
Comparing x2 with r,
x2 > r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA > lt,j cosφ− rA. (100)
If lt,j cosφ− rA < 0, then
φ ∈
{
(F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ −rA
{∅}, if lt,j < −rA.
(101)
If
lt,j cosφ− rA ≥ 0, (102)
then
φ ∈
{
[0,F3], if lt,j ≥ −rA
[0, pi], if lt,j < −rA.
(103)
Assuming that (45) and (102) hold, solving (100) gives
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − r2A < B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
(F2, pi], if − r2A ≥ B, lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
(F2, pi], if − r2A < B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(104)
Then, combining (103) and (104) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − A < B
r2
,−A ≥ B
3r2
, lt,j <
r2A+B
2r
[0, pi], if − A < B
r2
,−A < B
3r2
, lt,j < −rA
(F2, pi], if − A ≥ Br2 , −r
2A−B
2r
≤ lt,j < −rA
(F2, pi], if − A < Br2 ,−A > B3r2 , r
2A+B
2r
≤ lt,j < −rA
[0,F3], if − A < Br2 ,−A < B3r2 ,−rA ≤ lt,j < r
2A+B
2r
(F2,F3], if − A ≥ Br2 , lt,j ≥ −rA
(F2,F3], if − A < Br2 ,−A ≥ B3r2 , lt,j ≥ −rA
(F2,F3], if − A < Br2 ,−A < B3r2 , lt,j ≥ r
2A+B
2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(105)
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The unions of (101) and (105) yield
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − r2A < B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
(F2, pi], if lt,j ≥ |r
2A+B|
2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(106)
Meanwhile,
x2 ≤ r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≤ lt,j cosφ− rA. (107)
If lt,j cosφ− rA ≥ 0, then
φ ∈
{
[0,F3], if lt,j ≥ −rA
[0, pi], if lt,j < −rA.
(108)
Assuming that (45) hold, solving (107) gives
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
[0,F2], if lt,j ≥ |−r
2A−B|
2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(109)
The intersections of (108) and (109) are given by (109). Hence, the feasible regions for x2 > r or 0 ≤ x2 ≤ r
are given by (106) and (109), respectively. As a result, when x2 > r, we have (37). Meanwhile, when
0 ≤ x2 ≤ r, we have (38).
For A > 0, B < 0: Comparing x1 with 0 gives
φ ∈ [0, pi] , for x1 ≥ 0; and φ = ∅, for x1 < 0. (110)
Comparing x2 with 0 gives
φ = ∅, for x2 ≥ 0; and φ ∈ [0, pi] for x2 < 0. (111)
Comparing x1 with r,
x1 > r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA > rA− lt,j cosφ. (112)
If rA− lt,j cosφ < 0, then
φ ∈
{
[0,F3), if lt,j ≥ rA
{∅}, if lt,j < rA.
(113)
If
rA− lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, (114)
then
φ ∈
{
[F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ rA
[0, pi], if lt,j < rA.
(115)
Assuming that (45) and (114) hold, solving (112) gives
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
[0,F2], if − r2A ≤ B, lt,j ≥ r2A+B2r
[0,F2], if − r2A > B, lt,j ≥ −r2A−B2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(116)
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Then, combining (115) and (116) with intersections yields
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − A > B
r2
,−A ≥ B
3r2
, lt,j < rA
[0, pi], if − A > B
r2
,−A < B
3r2
, lt,j <
−r2A−B
2r
[0,F2], if − A ≤ Br2 , r
2A+B
2r
≤ lt,j < rA
[0,F2], if − A > Br2 ,−A < B3r2 , −r
2A−B
2r
≤ lt,j < rA
[F3, pi], if − A > Br2 ,−A > B3r2 , rA ≤ lt,j < −r
2A−B
2r
[F3,F2], if − A ≤ Br2 , lt,j ≥ rA
[F3,F2], if − A > Br2 ,−A ≥ B3r2 , lt,j ≥ −r
2A−B
2r
[F3,F2], if − A > Br2 ,−A < B3r2 , lt,j ≥ rA
{∅}, otherwise.
(117)
The unions of (113) and (117) yield
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − r2A > B, lt,j < −r2A−B2r
[0,F2], if lt,j ≥ |r2A+B|2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(118)
Meanwhile,
x1 ≤ r ⇒
√
(lt,j cosφ)
2 −BA ≤ rA− lt,j cosφ. (119)
If
rA− lt,j cosφ ≥ 0, (120)
then
φ ∈
{
[F3, pi], if lt,j ≥ rA
[0, pi], if lt,j < rA.
(121)
Assuming that (45) and (120) hold, solving (119) gives
φ ∈

[0, pi], if − r2A < B, lt,j < r2A+B2r
[F2, pi], if lt,j ≥ |r2A+B|2r
{∅}, otherwise.
(122)
The intersections of (121) and (122) is (122). Hence, the feasible regions for x1 > r or 0 ≤ x1 ≤ r are
given by (118) and (122), respectively. As a result of the above discussions, when x1 > r, we have (39).
Meanwhile, when 0 ≤ x1 ≤ r, we have (40).
For A = 0: The corresponding solution to 1 + (H
2+l2t,e)
−α
2 ηPs
(l2t,j+l2t,e−2lt,j lt,e cos(φ))
−α
2 Pj
≤ y is given by cosφ ≥ l2t,j−H2
2lt,j lt,e
.
Thus, we have
φ ∈

[
0, cos−1
(
l2t,j−H2
2lt,j lt,e
)]
, if |l
2
t,j−H2|
2lt,j
≤ lt,e
[0, pi], if
−l2t,j+H2
2lt,j
> lt,e
{∅}, otherwise.
(123)
Comparing lt,e from (123) with r, we have (41) - (43).
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